The Malegaon terror attacks are back
in the headlines sparked by the findings of an army court of inquiry instituted
to probe the role of Lt Colonel Prasad Purohit, one of the key accused in the
case. He was arrested on 5 November, 2008, nearly two months after the blast by
the Maharashtra Anti-Terror Squad, along with other members of the Hindu
right-wing organisation, Abhinav Bharat.
The army official was arrested in
2008 and has been in jail since then. Screen grab from CNN IBN
The results of the military inquiry
– obtained by Outlook – paint a different picture of Purohit,
wherein he emerges not as a terrorist mastermind but as an over-zealous
intelligence officer. Each of the 59 witnesses called by the military panel
describe a man with a proven track record of infiltrating extremist
organizations in the past – including SIMI, Tabliq-e-jamal, and Naxal
organisations [Read the Outlook exclusive here]:
This version is at odds with the
ATS’s allegation of Purohit being Abhinav Bharat’s leader. In the picture that
emerges from the COI testimonies, Sudhakar [Chaturvedi], currently an accused
in the case, worked for Abhinav Bharat and kept feeding Purohit inputs on the
right-wing group’s movements during the latter’s tenure as an intelligence
officer of the Deolali unit in Maharashtra. Gradually, he became a key source
and shortcut for Purohit to infiltrate right-wing groups. After Purohit was
posted to Pachmarhi in Madhya Pradesh, he handed over the “source” to his unit,
handled for a short while by the now retired Subedar Pawar.
There is also a significant paper
trail that reveals Purohit had indeed filed reports based on his insider
sources. The key among these is information he sent to senior intelligence
officers in mid October on the Malegaon blasts, naming Sadhvi Pragya Singh
Thakur and Indresh Kumar. The irony, of course, is that three weeks later, the
ATS arrested not just Thakur and Kumar, but also Purohit himself as the prime
suspects in the case.
As today’s Times of India points out,
the findings of the COI put the NIA’s case against Purohit in serious jeopardy.
Much of the evidence – conversations and close relationships with the key
accused – can now be explained as part of his undercover work. There is no
direct proof of his participation in the execution of the blasts themselves:
On two key evidential fronts — of
that of RDX procurement and financial assistance — agencies are still
floundering. While Purohit has been accused of stealing 60 kg RDX from J&K
while he was posted there and passing it on to the bomb planters, the trail has
not been established. Even the financial assistance routed through Purohit has
stopped at Abhinav Bharat and does not lead to the actual conspiracy.
But that does not mean Purohit’s
association with Abhinav Bharat was entirely innocent. Unlike his previous
undercover work with SIMI et al, he has acknowledged an ideological
“association” with an extremist organization of which he was a trustee.
In his first-ever interview with Outlook, when asked if he is in trouble because of his own
rightwing views, Purohit is evasive: “This is a tricky question, involving both
the army services and subjudice matters. I won’t be able to comment on this.”
But he later adds: “Having a particular ideology does not make me a terrorist
or anti-national.”
Pressed on his “explosive”
conversations with co-accused Dayanand Pandey where he talks about a “Hindu Rashtra,”
Purohit replies:
Being an intelligence officer or
even as a civilian I am allowed to talk to people. Nothing bars me from talking
to anyone. You must be having those transcripts. Have you heard or read
anywhere in those transcripts people talking or discussing the Malegaon blast
for which I have been behind bars for three-and-a-half years? If people don’t
understand what infiltration is, it is a sorry state of affairs.
In that one answer, Purohit offers
two different explanations: one, he has the right to hold rightwing views,
which are irrelevant if there is no proof of his participation in the blasts;
two, the rhetoric was part of his infiltration tactics and do not reflect his
personal views.
And also this: Would he be able to
offer this hair-splitting defense as a Muslim intelligence officer working
undercover with a Muslim extremist organization accused of terrorist acts?
Purohit’s personal right-wing
sympathies may not be evidence of guilt in the Malegaon case, but it does not
let him off the hook with the COI, where he is charged of “allegedly being a
member of Abhinav Bharat, an organisation not recognised by the armed forces of
the Union.”
The Outlook piece also raises
another unanswered question: “If Lt Col Purohit was doing only what his job demanded,
why did the army hand him over to the ATS so quickly?”
Security expert B Raman offers one possible answer in the Eurasian Review. Arguing that Purohit’s defense is
likely to land the army in big, big trouble, he writes:
The military intelligence is
authorised to collect tactical intelligence through human and technical means
in areas where the Army has a counter-insurgency role as in Jammu & Kashmir
and the North-East. In areas where it has no counter-insurgency role, it is not
permissible for the military intelligence to collect intelligence through any
means—particularly through the penetration of Indian organisations run by
Indian citizens…
It appears to me that the military
intelligence has so far avoided coming to the defence of Purohit in the case
under investigation previously by the Mumbai Police and now by the NIA due to
worries that if it did so, it could amount to its admitting its illegal actions
in mounting intelligence operations against Indian citizens by penetrating
Indian organisations.
The Malegaon case made headlines for
being the first ever case of saffron terrorism. But it may become memorable for
raising as many questions about the role of the military as it does of the
accused.
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